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ABSTRACT
Mobile technology has significant potential to help revolutionize
personal wellness and the delivery of healthcare. Mobile phones,
wearable sensors, and home-based tele-medicine devices can help
caregivers and individuals themselves better monitor and manage
their health. While the potential benefits of this “mHealth” technol-
ogy include better health, more effective healthcare, and reduced
cost, this technology also poses significant security and privacy chal-
lenges. In this paper we propose Amulet, an mHealth architecture
that provides strong security and privacy guarantees while remain-
ing easy to use, and outline the research and engineering challenges
required to realize the Amulet vision.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile phones, coupled with wearable sensors, implanted medi-
cal devices and home-based tele-medicine devices, can help care-
givers and individuals themselves better monitor and manage their
health [23]. Products are already emerging to support long-term
continuous medical monitoring for outpatients with chronic medical
conditions [27], individuals seeking to change behavior [6], physi-
cians needing to quantify and detect behavioral aberrations for early
diagnosis [2], or athletes wishing to monitor their condition and
performance [10]. In all of these examples, the health-related data
is typically stored in the Patient’s mobile phone, or in a cloud-based
health records system (HRS) operated by a healthcare provider or
device vendor. In this paper, we use the term “Patient” to describe
the subject of sensing in all such use cases, using the capitalized
form as a reminder of its broader meaning.
While the potential benefits of patient-centric “mHealth” technol-
ogy include better health, more effective healthcare, and reduced
cost, this technology also poses significant security and privacy
challenges [22]. To be successful, mHealth technology must be
(1) trusted by the Patient to ensure the privacy of the personal infor-
mation collected, (2) trusted by both Patient and Provider to ensure
the integrity of the data and the security of any actuators in the sys-
tem, and (3) usable without technical expertise. Current approaches
fail to provide the desired security, privacy, and usability goals, or
are limited to a specific solution isolated to a particular product. In
this paper we propose Amulet, an mHealth architecture (shown in
Figure 1) that provides strong security and privacy guarantees while
remaining easy to use, and outline the research and engineering
challenges required to realize the Amulet vision.
To enable trustworthy patient-centric mHealth we need to en-
sure several important properties. The system must provide data
confidentiality (avoiding exposure of patient data to unauthorized
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parties), data integrity (protecting data from tampering, or replay
of stale data), data authenticity (ensuring that the data comes from
the correct sensor, on the correct patient), data availability (limiting
data loss and latency), and command authenticity and integrity (en-
suring that commands sent to actuators are not forged, tampered, or
replayed). Furthermore, given the likely use of wireless body-area
communications, the system should protect patient anonymity (pre-
venting bystanders from learning the Patient’s identity or inferring
their medical condition). Most challenging, such systems must also
support interoperability and modularity (to avoid device prolifera-
tion), and ease of use (regarding both functionality and security).
For a comprehensive overview, see our earlier work [1, 25].
Existing approaches do not provide all of the above properties.
Although space is too limited to list all existing systems, all of them
fit into one of four models, each having significant limitations, as
shown in Figure 2. Many interesting mHealth applications involve
sensors that must be on the body, periodically or continuously,
obviating the first approach shown in the figure; but providing the
necessary computational and network infrastructure on every sensor
node is expensive, obviating the fourth approach. A mobile phone or
base station is often needed to provide computational and network
support. A base station (model 3) remains at home, and thus is not
always present. A mobile base station (e.g., HealthPAL [13]) or
mobile phone (model 2) provides portability, and yet may be set
aside, left behind, lost, or lent to another, thus it too may not be
present. General-purpose computing platforms, like mobile phones,
are difficult to secure [9]. Many critical applications (monitoring
the heart for atrial fibrillation, or managing blood glucose through
an insulin pump) require continuous presence of a trusted device.
Our position. To reach their full potential in transforming health-
care, wearable networks of sensors and actuators must be able to
operate continuously and securely without relying on mobile phones
and other non-wearable personal computing devices. We need a
personal device that is with the user at all times, can authenticate its
wearer, can be secured independently of other apps on the mobile
phone or home computer, can provide a trustworthy interface to the
user, and support mHealth devices with computation and a network
link to the mobile phone or other Internet gateway.
This paper describes our research vision for a trusted wrist-worn
platform called Amulet. An amulet is “an ornament or small piece
of jewelry thought to give protection against evil, danger, or disease”
[MacOS dictionary]. Unlike prior approaches, Amulet is designed to
enable continuous sensing and actuation, requiring a wireless gate-
way (mobile phone or access point) only for occasional connectivity
to back-end servers and other off-body network resources.
When complete, Amulet makes six contributions. (1) Amulet
is an omnipresent, trustworthy hub for patient-centric mHealth that
is usable, secure, and interoperable. (2) Amulet provides a means
to authenticate its wearer, and to determine which set of sensors
are on the same body. (3) Amulet provides a trustworthy path for
mHealth devices to communicate with their wearer, the Patient.
(4) Amulet provides a physically secure but easily accessible port
for access to data in emergencies. (5) Amulet is a robust security
architecture based on a tamper-resistant physical platform, cleanly
separates the health-related apps on Amulet and the Patient’s other
Figure 1: Our proposed architecture is built around a trustworthy wrist-worn Amulet device.
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apps on a mobile phone or PC, and supports a secure method for
software distribution and management. (6) Amulet provides a safer
programming model for safety-critical processes, automating data
provenance and other security tasks.
In the following sections we describe Amulet, discuss its many
advantages over the existing models, address some of the potential
disadvantages, and outline the research and engineering challenges
required to realize the Amulet vision.
2. AMULET VISION
In this section we describe our Amulet vision with two scenarios.
Scenario 1 (Diabetes). Susan is a diabetic who finds it difficult to
manage her condition effectively, resulting in significant variation
in her diurnal blood-glucose levels. Susan visits her doctor for
consultation. Her doctor prescribes a continuous glucose monitor,
an insulin pump, and a particular insulin therapy and adds this
prescription to her health record. Susan’s pharmacy has access
to the prescriptions in the health record, and provides her with a
glucose sensor and a pump (both approved by a trusted third party,
e.g., the FDA). The pharmacist calibrates the two devices and then
installs appropriate trusted software, configuring it to provide the
sensing regimen and the insulin therapy as prescribed by the doctor.
Finally, the pharmacist enters Susan’s information (her patient ID,
and her Amulet’s public key) in the devices.
After receiving the devices from the pharmacy, Susan associates
them with her Amulet. She presses a button on the Amulet that
tells the Amulet that it needs to associate with a nearby device, and
moves her wrist over the glucose sensor. The NFC signal from
the Amulet activates the glucose sensor and it associates with the
Amulet, after the sensor verifies that it is indeed Susan’s Amulet
and Susan’s Amulet verifies whether this type of glucose sensor
was prescribed to her. (Her Amulet syncs with her health record
periodically and knows what medical devices have been prescribed.)
She repeats the association process with the insulin pump. During
the association process, the devices share a URL with the Amulet,
which points to a signed piece of code (much like an ‘app’ on a
mobile phone) that the Amulet downloads, verifies, and installs. The
Amulet uses this app to communicate with and manage the devices.
The Amulet discreetly alerts Susan whenever her glucose levels
require attention, through visual, audible, or tactile feedback; if
she wants to see more detail, the Amulet shares the data with her
phone or tablet to leverage the larger display. The Amulet periodi-
cally sends the glucose readings and insulin dose information to the
hospital HRS via her mobile phone.
Scenario 2 (Emergency access). Helen has cardiac complications
after suffering a stroke last year. She has since been conscientious
about managing her health. She upgraded her Amulet with an app
that tells her about her physical activity, and her sleep quality (using
the accelerometer in her Amulet). She bought a body scale, blood-
pressure cuff, and a treadmill—devices that can be bought without
a doctor’s prescription. She associates the scale and the treadmill
with her Amulet by swiping the Amulet near the scale and the
treadmill and pressing a button on her Amulet to approve adding
new devices. Now, whenever Helen steps on the scale it displays her
weight, fat percentage, and body mass index. Whenever she steps
on the treadmill to workout, the treadmill recognizes her (using her
Amulet as an identity proxy), and picks a pre-configured workout.
Periodically, the scale and the treadmill upload their data to the
cloud using the home network (the devices can connect to the home
network because the Amulet shared information about the home
network with the devices during the association process). She also
actively logs her diet in her iPhone (and the iPhone shares this
data with her Amulet). Weeks later, when she visits her parents,
Helen tells them about her efforts and how she keeps track of her
health. She walks near the display in their house and uses gesture
recognition to associate the display to her Amulet. She uses her
Amulet to select which information is shown on the television.
Her new job is demanding and requires long hours, which nega-
tively affect her stress, diet, and sleep. While walking home one day,
she collapses. When emergency responders arrive on the scene, and
prepare to take her to the nearby hospital, one responder opens a flap
over the mini-USB port on the side of the Amulet. The responder
then plugs a USB cable from his PDA to the Amulet. The Amulet
provides information, in a standard format, about her medical his-
tory, allergies, medications, insurance details, emergency contacts,
and a log of the past 24 hours (which includes her sleep data from
last night, her activity level, and diet information). The emergency
responder forwards this information to the nearby hospital, which
uses it to make the necessary preparations while she is en route.
3. AMULET ADVANTAGES
As a small form-factor special-purpose device that is tightly cou-
pled to a Patient’s body, Amulet has significant usability, security,
and interoperability advantages over existing mobile phone and
home base-station systems. We summarize those advantages here.
Usability is a critically important consideration for any mobile
device, and even more so for wearable devices. To be successful,
patient-centered mHealth devices must be simple, require minimal
configuration, and blend into the Patient’s daily life.
The Amulet is tightly coupled to the Patient, unlike a mobile
phone – phones are often lost, left at home, temporarily lent to
others, or cannot be carried everywhere (e.g., contact sports). Any
device that provides support for safety-critical sensors and actuators
must be ever-present. The wrist-worn Amulet can comfortably be
worn at all times (even when sleeping); it may even be waterproof
to allow bathing. (Even if the Amulet is removed for some activities,
it will likely be more present than a phone, and it would never be
lent to another like one might lend a phone.)
The Amulet is in a socially-accepted form factor – a wrist-watch –
that is functional jewelry for both genders and most cultures, unlike
other wearable alternatives. Such a common form factor is actually
beneficial from a privacy point of view, because unlike a mobile base
Figure 2: Various approaches to patient-centric mHealth.
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1. Mobile Phone (MP). A phone’s internal sensors can be used for health-related monitoring, but
some health conditions require other sensors or require contact with a specific part of the body. If
the phone is compromised (mobile phone malware is an increasing risk), lost, set aside, or lent to
someone else, data may be exposed to, or collected about, the wrong person.
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2. MP + wearable or home-based actuator node (AN) or sensor node (SN). The MP may
communicate with wearable or nearby devices like a blood-pressure cuff; this architecture is
common in the literature. One early example [20] imagined a PDA or cellphone as the hub of a
body-area network of mHealth sensors; that paper, like most, did not address the security issues.
Again, what if the mobile phone is absent, lost, or compromised? Likewise, are we sure the phone
is on the same body as the sensor or actuator [7]? And are they on the right body?
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3. Base station (Base) + AN/SN. In many current products, the device vendor provides a proprietary
base station (or PC dongle), which provides a gateway to the Internet and in some cases a user
interface. With a base station for every device, homeowners must configure each base station for
their home network, which is inconvenient. Base stations could be equipped with a cellular modem
to provide Internet access, increasing cost; Qualcomm’s 2Net product is one example. Movement of
sensor nodes (SN) outside the range of a base station limits the timely delivery of data.
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4. AN/SN with direct connection to HRS. Some home devices have an integrated Wi-Fi or cellular
connection and therefore require no communication gateway. Many of the problems described above
remain, and the resulting increases in size, weight, power, and cost may be prohibitive for many
wearable devices. Cellular modems can draw up to two watts of power, and even the smallest Wi-Fi
modems draw more than 100mA of current in their range-limited low-power transmit mode. Other
challenges include increases in complexity (more bugs) and an independent network connection
that increases exposure to network-based attacks.
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5. Amulet model. The Amulet model adds another device to the picture, but it has many advantages
(described in Section 3) largely because it operates independently of the mobile phone, is physically
attached to the Patient, and is specifically designed for supporting mHealth sensors and actuators.
station (e.g., HealthPAL [13]) the presence of an Amulet does not
reveal anything about the Patient’s medical condition, or even that
she has a condition. Not everyone wears a watch, but if the Amulet
is comfortable, stylish, and provides an important health-related
function, we expect people will be willing to wear one.
Because it is physically attached to the wearer, the Amulet serves
as an identity token when interacting with shared health devices (at
home or in clinic) such as a scale, BP cuff, or display. In Sce-
nario 2, recall that the treadmill recognized Helen by her Amulet.
The Amulet’s form factor also ensures that it is always in the same
position on the body, while a phone in a pocket or purse tends to
be loose and even a holster may change position from day to day.
This tight coupling to the Patient’s body provides a natural oppor-
tunity for improved accelerometer-based activity recognition [4],
for one-body authentication [7], and for seamless gesture-based
interfaces [15]. The Amulet is constantly in contact with the skin,
which provides the opportunity to measure many of the Patient’s
physiological parameters, like heart rate, blood oxygenation, gal-
vanic skin response (GSR), and electrical impedance – parameters
that are useful in a wide range of medical contexts and may also be
useful for automatically authenticating the Patient to the Amulet,
without the need to enter pins and passwords [24].
The Amulet is readily accessible at all times; it has a small glance-
able display (which is better than any pocket or holster device); with
an internal accelerometer and gyroscope it can detect many different
gestures, which would make interacting with devices intuitive and
easy. Mobile phones have a rich interface and more resources
compared to the Amulet, but most people still find it difficult to
connect them with other devices (e.g., consider the challenge of
securely pairing a device with a mobile phone) [14].
Security is critically important to medical-grade applications. The
Amulet provides complete (physical) isolation between general-
purpose applications (running on the mobile phone) and critical
applications (running on the Amulet); with appropriate hardware
support, the Amulet could provide strong isolation between indi-
vidual apps. In contrast, today’s phones are complex multipurpose
computing platforms that host a variety of applications provided by
different sources, some of whom the Patient may not trust. This
makes them susceptible to malware [9] and other software-based
attacks. Dual-persona phones [8] can provide some software-level
isolation among applications, but none of the other usability ad-
vantages outlined above. Nonetheless, Amulet would find a dual-
persona phone to be a good partner, when it is available, to provide
a larger display or extra computational power.
The Amulet, as a limited-function device running only mHealth
apps, can provide much tighter security than a general-purpose
phone. Its very simplicity reduces the attack surface. The Amulet
supports a relatively narrow range of apps, making it possible to
manage execution more strictly. One could re-think the OS de-
sign, and design-in security mechanisms (crypto, audit logs, data
provenance) as first-class primitives.
Amulet provides a path for discreet output to the Patient (on a
small screen, with audible tones, or with vibration). A phone may
be infected with malware, and fail to maintain confidentiality or
integrity of data displayed. Alerts displayed on the phone may be
visible to others who pick up or borrow your phone.
Amulet provides a path for trusted input from the Patient. As a
small special-purpose device it can guarantee apps secure access to
its limited interface (a few buttons, a small touch-screen, gestures).
The Amulet can verify whether it is on the right Patient (see below),
and determine whether the user input is coming from the right
person. A smartphone, in contrast, can be borrowed or shared,
and its input can come from someone other than the Patient, or a
malicious program on the smartphone can alter the user’s input.
Amulet can include tamper-resistant secure storage for keys –
private keys for authenticating the patient, or public keys for authen-
ticating the provider and HRS servers, or session keys with various
devices and services. A phone is not suitable for this purpose unless
a major manufacturer decides to build in secure storage and make
it available to developers. Capacity is cheap; even microSD cards
have multi-gigabyte storage, and can be secured with encryption.
The Amulet maintains a secure audit log of its activities – in-
cluding installation of apps, association of devices, actions taken by
actuators, and uses of the emergency-access port – for later review
by the Patient, health provider, or even forensic examiners.
Interoperability between wearable devices, mobile devices, and
cloud-based services poses significant challenges. The drive for long
operational lifetimes has inspired the development of a wide range
of low-power wireless technologies (Zigbee, Bluetooth Low Energy,
ANT, and various proprietary technologies). An Amulet with multi-
ple low-power radios can make it possible to build mHealth WBANs
from devices with heterogeneous radio technologies, and can pro-
vide a gateway between a WBAN and a mobile phone. (Phone de-
signers include common standards, such as Bluetooth, but mHealth
devices may have (or need) a different radio; Amulet can be de-
signed with these medically-relevant radios inside.)
Emergency access is enabled because the Amulet is always present
on the Patient, always on the wrist; conversely, a mobile phone may
have been left behind, separated from the Patient during a traumatic
accident, or difficult to find in backpack or handbag. The Amulet
includes a mini-USB port for emergency responders to retrieve basic
information about the Patient’s identity, medical history, allergies,
prescriptions, and recent medical condition. Physical access to the
port would be difficult without the Patient’s knowledge, preventing
mis-use in non-emergent conditions, and yet access is easy when
the Patient is unconscious (under implied consent). Indeed, the USB
port would provide access to the data only when the Amulet is on
the wrist of its Patient; otherwise the data remains encrypted within
the Amulet. This approach ensures that the data is secure even if the
Patient loses the Amulet.
The Amulet can verify whether it is on the right Patient using
physiological parameters (e.g., GSR, pulse) as biometrics when it
is worn, and it can assume that it is on the right Patient until it is
taken off the wrist (an action we expect can be detected reliably).
Thus, even in an emergency situation where a reliable biometric is
no longer available, the Amulet knows it is still on the right Patient.
(There should be a “Break the Glass” (BTG) access mechanism that
emergency responders can use when all other emergency access
mechanisms fail. For example, Gardner et al. [11] use a special key
share (BTG-share) to decrypt the PHR data on the phone, and emer-
gency responders obtain this share through a special authorization
process, independent of any input from the Patient.)
4. AMULET DISADVANTAGES
There are some obvious disadvantages to Amulet. Patients might
not want to wear an additional device like an Amulet. However, we
expect that a Patient’s concern about their health along with a general
desire for the security and privacy of their health information will be
motivation enough to wear an Amulet. Additionally, such a device
might be too expensive for Patients to purchase. Relevant platforms
are starting to reach the market, such as the MetaWatch [17] and
MOTOACTV [18]; their retail cost of US$200 will doubtless come
down with scale. Insurance companies might subsidize the cost of
an Amulet because it might lower their own costs.
From a technological standpoint, one might criticize the relatively
limited resources on an Amulet: with less processing power than a
mobile phone an Amulet cannot accomplish some of the things that
a phone could. We anticipate that such a device will be powerful
enough for most health-monitoring applications, and the power of
the device will grow over time while maintaining the same form
factor. The TI CC2540 Bluetooth Low Energy radio consumes
55 mW when transmitting and 47 mW when receiving at 1 Mbps; a
two channel Holter monitor with a 1 kHz sample rate could send data
continuously (batched every 10 s) via an Amulet with a 100 mA 3V
battery for more than seven days. Data compression could further
extend battery life for transmission. The limited nature of an Amulet
also allows us to keep our design simple, which benefits the security
of the device by shrinking the attack surface.
Finally, Amulet adds some complexity to the existing systems in
place; indeed it is yet another device to configure and a potential
point of failure. However, the security Amulet provides to the system
as a whole outweighs the added complexity, and the hardened nature
of Amulet makes it resistant to targeted attacks.
5. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Many systems and techniques exist that can be leveraged in order
to realize the Amulet vision, including protocols for energy-efficient
privacy-preserving wireless communication [16] and secure key
management [3, 26], as well as OS-level techniques for code isola-
tion [5, 12] and gesture-based interactions [15].
Many of these techniques are too heavyweight for use on low-
power wearable devices and will have to be adapted or redesigned.
Furthermore, Amulet’s success depends on overcoming several addi-
tional challenges and taking advantage of key opportunities related
to the hardware design, usability, programming model, and code
deployment. In this section we list these challenges and sketch some
research directions.
5.1 Hardware platform
An ideal Amulet will be small, easily wearable, have long battery
life, one or more low-power radios, and sufficient processing power
to handle data from a variety of sensor types and provide strong
cryptographic algorithms. While we expect future improvements
in processor and radio efficiencies and energy storage to ease the
tension between battery lifetime and capabilities, we explore Amulet
feasibility here in the context of existing hardware. A TI bench-
mark study [19] that computes a Finite Impulse Response (FIR)
filter, similar to tasks an Amulet might execute, showed the TI
MSP430 and ARM processor family can compute 20,142 FIR’s
per second (ARM) and 233 FIR’s per second (MSP430). These
microcontrollers are used in the MetaWatch [17] and WIMM Labs
WIMM commercial platforms [28], two candidates for an Amulet
platform. Our initial experiments using the TI CC1101 low-power
radio in the MSP430-based Chronos wristwatch platform, with a
continuous stream of three-axis accelerometer data at 33Hz, resulted
in a CR2032 button battery lasting a week. Many Amulet apps will
require less communication and may also be able to harvest energy
in order to achieve longer lifetimes. The research challenge here is
to balance the form factor, CPU and radio characteristics, workload
allowance, and battery life to design an Amulet that is useful for a
wide range of applications. And, furthermore, to incorporate hard-
ware support for secure key storage and strong isolation between
mHealth apps on the Amulet.
5.2 Usable wearable security
The hardware and form-factor constraints inherent to Amulet
demand a fundamentally different approach to security. In addition
to having scant processing and energy resources, the Amulet’s user
interface is limited as well. For example, it is unreasonable to expect
users to type strong passwords using a few buttons and a tiny screen.
Furthermore, the security of Amulet must be mindful of processing
and energy overhead as well as usability.
In spite of its limitations, a wearable Amulet has many security-
related advantages of over traditional computing devices. For ex-
ample, a mobile phone can be in many locations over the course
of a day. Its owner might carry it in a pocket or purse, hold it in
their hand, set it on the table, or lend it to another person. A loose
coupling between a device and its owner makes it difficult to pro-
vide guarantees about the authenticity of the data, and it may not be
possible to associate sensor data to the correct Patient.
In contrast, the Amulet is physically strapped to a Patient’s body,
and it is not likely to be shared. Furthermore, the Amulet can always
know when it is strapped to a Patient. Gesture recognition, using a
built-in accelerometer, could be used for active authentication, or
biometric sensors could authenticate the Patient passively. In con-
trast, there is no unobtrusive way for a mobile phone to authenticate
which Patient is carrying it.
The biggest risks result from the loss or theft of a Patient’s Amulet.
An adversary may seek to extract stored sensor data or medical
information, use the Amulet to authenticate as the Patient to various
other devices, or use the Amulet to obtain live access to the Patient’s
sensors and actuators; such threats can be reduced if the Amulet has
the capability to reliably authenticate its wearer as described above.
Even if a mobile phone could authenticate the Patient, wearable
sensor nodes present another problem. Because such nodes typically
communicate with a mobile phone wirelessly, the mobile phone
now needs to verify that the sensor is collecting data about the same
Patient the mobile phone has authenticated. Not doing so would
violate the authenticity of the data since Patient A could authenticate
with the mobile phone while Patient B could be wearing the sensor.
The mobile phone would then be labeling sensor data about Patient B
as coming from Patient A. Thus, the mobile phone needs to be
able to perform some type of “same-body authentication” when
other sensor nodes are present. Our prior research has shown that
accelerometer-based techniques can be used to determine whether
two devices are worn on the same body [7], although detecting
which Patient is wearing a device remains an open and challenging
problem. In both cases, a device, like Amulet, that is tightly coupled
to the Patient’s body is likely to improve both the feasibility and
accuracy of these authentication schemes.
Poon et al. [21] demonstrate that it is possible to use biometrics,
specifically the inter-pulse interval (IPI), as a shared secret that
can be used to securely share encryption keys among sensor nodes
on the same body. It is conceivable that this technology could be
incorporated to the Amulet or its wristband, providing one means
of bootstrapping secure communications with nodes in contact with
the skin elsewhere on the body.
5.3 Programming model
In addition to enabling automatic authentication, a more focused
device, like Amulet, also has the opportunity to provide a much safer
and trustworthy computing environment than a mobile phone or PC.
During operation, Amulet runs apps that interact with wearable
sensors, actuators, or home devices. These apps may collect health
information and forward it to a health record system. They may give
feedback or encouragement about fitness-based data. Amulet may
also provide limited access to its data to emergency responders.
In spite of this variation, Amulet’s apps share many common
functions, including sensor discovery, wireless connection handling,
encrypting and decrypting data, managing cryptographic keys, pro-
cessing sensor data streams, routing data and commands to the
cloud or to a medical actuator, and securely managing metadata
for post-facto auditing and establishing data provenance. These
functions add complexity to apps, and the safety and security of
the system depends on these tasks being implemented correctly.
Amulet’s execution environment will provide OS-level support to
mHealth apps, with the goal of allowing App developers to focus
on the health-related logic and data processing while the Amulet
system automates many security and networking tasks. Our focus
is on determining what abstractions are most useful, which tasks
should be completely automated, and how to balance the need for
developer flexibility and security.
5.4 Code Deployment
Finally, the security of Amulet’s programming model depends in
part on our ability to safely deploy code to a Patient’s Amulet, and
manage that code throughout the deployment lifecycle.
Amulet setup. How can the Patient’s Amulet ensure that it is
strapped to the right Patient and that it is linked to the right Pa-
tient record? While pairing with mHealth devices, how can the
Amulet verify that it is associating with the right mHealth devices,
that are collecting health information about the same Patient? As
we mention above, the Amulet may use gesture recognition or Pa-
tient biometrics to identify the right Patient. The Amulet generates
cryptographic keys, saved in tamper-resistant secure storage; it uses
these keys to provide encrypted data storage, an encrypted audit log,
and an API for secure communication.
Prescription. To safely deploy software to an Amulet, we envision
a prescription-based approach, in which a provider writes a software
prescription, similar to how medications are prescribed, using terms
familiar to physicians. An “application pharmacy” could translate a
healthcare provider’s nontechnical prescription into a combination
of application software and configurations. The pharmacy might
also be tasked with detecting harmful interactions between apps.
We also expect that a Patient would be able to purchase and install
some devices and apps without a prescription.
Developing a workable ecosystem for sensor-software prescrip-
tions will require consideration of the interests and demands of
manufacturers, physicians, patients, and FDA regulators, and will
likely require precise definitions for types of sensing that might be
useful to providers which may or may not fit well with existing
medical terminology.
Installation. Once the Patient obtains a new device, how can she
verify that it is the right device, as prescribed by the doctor? How
can the Patient easily pair her Amulet with the device? To avoid
any misuse of medical devices, how can the pharmacist ensure
that the purchased medical device is being used by the intended
Patient? We sketch some ideas in preceding sections, leveraging
existing trust relationships between Patient and provider, Patient
and pharmacist, to ensure that only trustworthy apps and authentic
devices are installed.
Collection. How can we ensure that the devices associate with the
app on the patient’s Amulet without patient intervention every time?
During installation (above), the device and Amulet exchange keys
that allow them to re-discover and re-connect in the future. When-
ever the device discovers and authenticates one of its associated
Amulets, the data collected is encrypted and sent to the relevant
Amulet app for processing.
Control. Apps on the Amulet are responsible for controlling the
actions of the sensor and actuator nodes; in the case of sensors, the
application monitors the sensors and other contextual information
to adjust (as needed) sensing parameters like sample rate. For actua-
tors, of course, the application has overall responsibility for ensuring
the actuator is operating correctly according to the treatment proto-
col. What programming model most effectively splits these duties
between Amulet apps, sensors, and actuators?
Processing. Sensor-data processing can occur on a sensor device,
the Amulet, a backend server, or on a mobile phone (for less-
sensitive applications). What programming abstractions can help
the developer work with this split-computation model? The Amulet
provides common functions for processing and aggregation of sen-
sor data, and access to greater computation power, while processing
on the sensor reduces WBAN bandwidth requirements. An Amulet
app collects the data from one or more sensors and sends it to the
Patient’s health record, so that it can be shared with the Patient’s
health providers, family and friends. How can the data recipients
verify whether the data is coming from the right sensor, was used by
the right Patient and in the right manner? To verify the provenance
of the Patient’s health data, the recipients might need information
about the sensor, the Patient and the context in which the data was
collected. The Amulet can act as the coordinating device to gather
provenance data. How can the Amulet understand the applications’
requirements and act efficiently to gather this metadata?
Uninstallation. How many apps and devices should an Amulet
support? There might be a limit to the number of apps that can
be installed on the Amulet or the number of devices that it can
manage. Who should be able to remove apps from the Amulet?
Some apps should be at the discretion of the Patient, but there
may be medically-critical apps that should only be removed by a
physician or pharmacist.
6. SUMMARY
We propose Amulet, a trustworthy mHealth companion device
worn like a wrist watch. Our position is that mHealth will only
succeed in achieving its goals of improving health and reducing the
costs of healthcare if the envisioned health-monitoring and health-
management applications are trustworthy. Amulet provides a basis
for trust in body-area mHealth systems. Amulet is easy to use,
omnipresent, able to authenticate its wearer, and able to mediate
communications between the WBAN and smartphone or access
point. Amulet provides a path for trusted input from and output to
its user, and a secure execution platform for small “apps” that moni-
tor the Patient’s health or manage treatment. We outline Amulet’s
advantages and disadvantages, comparing it to other current ap-
proaches, and we identify the key research challenges required to
make Amulet a reality.
Amulet has security, usability, and interoperability advantages
over the other approaches outlined in Figure 2. Specifically, it has
many security and privacy advantages: (1) The Amulet is tightly
coupled to the Patient, unlike a mobile phone, which makes it ideal
for safety-critical sensors and actuators. Emergency access is en-
abled because Amulet is always present on the Patient, always on
the wrist. (2) Authorized parties (e.g., emergency responders) can
access Patient’s data through a USB port, but only when the Amulet
is on the wrist of its Patient; otherwise the data remains encrypted
within the Amulet. (3) The Amulet provides complete (physical)
isolation between general-purpose apps (which could be suscepti-
ble to software-based attacks), running on the mobile phone, and
critical apps (running on the Amulet). (4) Amulet provides a path
for discreet output to and trusted input from the Patient, whereas
a phone could be accessible to someone other than the Patient and
also susceptible to malware attacks. (5) The Amulet is in a socially-
accepted form factor; the presence of an Amulet does not reveal
anything about the Patient’s medical condition. (6) The Amulet can
include tamper-resistant secure storage for keys and could maintain
a secure audit log of all its activities.
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